陕西省咸阳市人民政府


咸政发〔2006〕53号

关于印发咸阳市经济适用住房建设管理规定的通知



各县市区人民政府，市人民政府各工作部门、直属机构：
《咸阳市经济适用住房建设管理规定》已经市政府第二十三次常务会议研究通过，现予印发，自2006年10月9日起施行。



二○○六年十月九日

咸阳市经济适用住房建设管理规定

第一章 总 则

第一条 根据建设部、国家发改委、国土资源部、中国人民银行《经济适用住房管理办法》和陕西省实施《经济适用住房管理办法》细则，结合我市实际，制定本规定。
第二条 本规定所称经济适用住房，是指政府提供政策优惠，限定建设标准、供应对象和销售价格，具有保障性质的政策性商品住房。
集资、合作建房也是经济适用住房的组成部分，其建设标准、优惠政策、上市条件、供应对象的审核均按照经济适用住房的有关规定严格执行。
本规定所称集资建房，是指住房困难户较多的工矿区和企业，在符合城市规划、土地利用总体规划和单位发展计划的前提下，利用单位自用土地进行集资建房，按规定出售给本单位的住房困难职工的住房。
本规定所称合作建房，是指中低收入家庭的职工、居民投资组建住房合作社，以改善自身居住条件，不以盈利为目的的合作经济组织为社员建房。
第三条 咸阳市房产管理局（以下统称“市经济适用住房行政主管部门）负责市区范围内经济适用住房的组织实施和管理工作并对各县（市）经济适用住房的建设和管理指导和监督。
市发展改革、国土资源、建设规划、价格行政主管部门和金融机构根据职责分工，负责经济适用住房的相关工作。
第四条 市经济适用住房行政主管部门会同市发展改革、建设规划、国土资源行政主管部门根据土地利用总体规划、城市总体规划和中低收入家庭的住房水平以及市场需求，编制经济适用住房发展规划，做好项目储备。
第五条 市发展改革行政主管部门会同市经济适用住房、规划、国土资源行政主管部门依据经济适用住房发展规划和省上下达的经济适用住房年度建设投资指导性计划及项目储备情况，编制下达经济适用住房年度建设投资计划和用地计划。
经济适用住房建设用地应在年度土地供应计划中统筹优先安排。
集资、合作建房也应当纳入经济适用住房建设计划和用地计划管理。
中、省驻咸企事业单位及军队的经济适用住房建设，实行属地化管理。纳入本市经济适用住房建设计划，统一管理。

第二章 优惠政策

第六条 经济适用住房建设用地，按照城市总体规划和土地利用总体规划的要求，合理布局，依法实行行政划拨方式供应。
严禁以经济适用住房名义取得划拨土地后，改变土地用途，或变相搞其他商品房开发。
第七条 经济适用住房建设和经营中的行政事业性收费，减半征收。
经济适用住房项目小区外基础设施建设费用，由政府负担。
第八条 已建立住房公积金的职工购买经济适用住房，可优先申请住房公积金贷款。
第九条 购买经济适用住房的个人向商业银行申请贷款，除符合《个人住房贷款管理办法》规定外，还应当提供准予购买经济适用住房的证明。商业银行在执行中国人民银行贷款利率时不得上浮。
第十条 经济适用住房建设单位可以以在建项目作抵押向商业银行申请住房开发贷款。

第三章 开发建设

第十一条 经济适用住房的规划设计管理，应当坚持标准适度、功能齐全、经济适用、便利节能的原则，并结合全面建设小康社会的目标，优化规划设计方案，不得在城市中心小规模、零星分散建设。10万平方米以上的住宅小区规划设计方案要由市政府组织论证审批，报省建设厅备案。经济适用住房建设必须严格执行国家有关技术规范和标准，积极推广应用先进、成熟、适用的新技术、新工艺、新材料、新设备，提高建设水平。
第十二条 经济适用住房开发建设按照政府组织，市场运作的原则，实行项目法人招标。
第十三条 参与建设的房地产开发企业必须具有相应等级房地产开发资质；具有良好的开发业绩和社会 信誉;自有资本金占投标项目总额35%以上。
第十四条 在新征地建设经济适用住房时必须套建不少于总建筑面积3%的廉租房，无偿交于市政府，由市房产管理部门代管。并按市政府《廉租住房管理办法》的规定分配给社会特困户，其建设资金用经济适用住房规定的3%的利润解决。
第十五条 集资、合作建房的单位，可以按照规定直接组织集资建房和合作建房的开发建设，集资、合作建设经济适用住房，执行建房成本价，不得有利润，只允许集资、合作建房的单位收取不超过建设成本2%的管理费。
第十六条 经济适用住房建设要严格控制户型，坚持以中小套型为主。户型标准一般分为60平方米、70平方米、85平方米三种，其比例为：85平方米左右的户型应占50%以上，60平方米和70平方米左右的户型不少于20%。具体户型及比例，由市经济适用住房行政主管部门在审查时结合实际掌握并严格管理。市建设规划行政主管部门在审查规划设计方案时把关。
第十七条 建设经济适用住房应当按照建设总面积3‰的标准配套建设物业管理用房。
第十八条 集资建设经济适用住房套型应符合本规定，所建设的住房套数原则上不得超过本单位集资职工人数。禁止将集资所建经济适用住房出售给本单位以外的其他人员。对集资所建设的经济适用住房交付原集资职工后剩余的房屋，由市经济适用住房行政主管部门按照本办法规定统一调配，供符合购买经济适用住房条件的人员选择购买。
第十九条 经济适用住房的建设单位对其开发建设的经济适用住房的工程质量负最终责任。
建设单位应当向买受人出具《住宅质量保证书》和《使用说明书》，并承担保修责任。

第四章 价格和公示

第二十条 经济适用住房价格实行成本审查制度。市价格行政主管部门在接到经济适用住房开发经营企业的定价申请后，指定有资质的价格成本认证机构进行成本审查，并出具成本审查报告。
第二十一条 经济适用住房价格制定应遵循保本微利原则。
经济适用住房基准价和浮动幅度由市价格行政主管部门按照管理权限，依据成本审查报告制定，同时报上一级价格主管部门备案。
经济适用住房销售价格和租金标准由市价格行政主管部门会同经济适用住房行政主管部门在综合考虑建设、管理成本和不高于3%利润的基础上确定。
市经济适用住房行政主管部门应当及时将可以销售的经济适用住房的位置、数量、套型、单套建筑面积、基准价格等情况予以公布。
第二十二条 建设单位需在销售场所显著位置公示批准的基准价格、浮动价格及批准文号，其浮动价格不得超过市价格行政主管部门批准的浮动幅度，不得在公示之外收取任何未予标明的费用。
第二十三条 实行经济适用住房开发经营企业交费登记卡制度。交费登记卡由市价格行政主管部门依法制发，各有关部门按规定收取费用时，必须填写市价格行政主管部门核发的交费登记卡 。任何单位不得以押金、保证金等名义，变相向经济适用住房建设单位收取费用。

第五章 销售管理

第二十四条 经济适用住房应当面向中低收入家庭销售。销售对象要公示。不得销售给高收入家庭。不得向单位成批或整幢销售。
参加集资、合作建房的对象视同经济适用住房的购买者。
第二十五条 购买经济适用住房实行申请、审批和公示制度。
第二十六条 中低收入家庭，可按4-6倍的房价收入比（即购买本地一套建筑面积60平方米普通商品住房的价格与双职工家庭年均工资之比）确定。由市经济适用住房行政主管部门会同相关部门合理确定中低收入家庭的标准，上报市人民政府批准后,每年公布一次。
第二十七条 符合下列条件的中低收入家庭可以申请购买一套经济适用住房：
（一）有咸阳市市区城镇户口（含符合当地安置条件的军队人员）或市人民政府确定的供应对象；
（二）无房或现住房面积低于市区人均平均住房面积以下的住房困难家庭；
（三）家庭收入符合市人民政府划定的收入线标准；
（四）市人民政府规定的其他条件。
第二十八条 个人购买经济适用住房，由市经济适用住房行政主管部门依照陕办发[1990]6号文件规定核准其购房面积。购房人必须按照核准的购房面积选购经济适用住房，不得跳档选购。
第二十九条 申请购买经济适用住房按照下列程序办理：
（一）申请人持家庭户口本、身份证、所在单位或街道办事处出具的家庭收入证明和住房情况证明，以及相关证明文件向市经济适用住房行政主管部门提出书面申请。并填写《咸阳市城镇居民购买经济适用住房申请表》。
（二）市经济适用住房行政主管部门收到申请及《申请表》后，应对申请人提供的相关资料进行核查,符合条件的，应予以公示。公示期限为30日。公示后无异议或异议不成立的，在《申请表》上签署核查意见，注明应购买的面积标准，作为申请人的购买凭证。
（三）申请人持经过签署核查意见的《咸阳市城镇居民购买经济适用住房申请表》,到开发建设单位选购经济适用住房。购买面积原则上不得超过核准面积。购买面积在核准面积以内的，按市价格行政主管部门公示价格购买；由于套型原因，购买面积略超过核准面积的部分，按标准的价格购买；购买面积超过标准面积的部分，由购房人按相同区位商品房价格补交差价。超面积部分的差价款由售房单位在办理产权证时交市经济适用住房行政主管部门,上缴市财政,作为廉租住房基金。
（四）申请人购买经济适用住房后，按规定办理权属登记。房产部门在办理产权登记时，应当分别注明经济适用住房、划拨用地。其中如有超标准面积补交相应差价的，也应当注明补交差价的面积。
第三十条 参加集资、合作建房的对象，必须符合本规定第二十六条规定的购买经济适用住房的条件的规定。凡已经享受房改政策购房、购买了经济适用住房或参加了集资、合作建房的人员，不得再次参加集资、合作建房，严禁任何单位借集资、合作建房名义，变相实物分配或从事商品房开发。
第三十一条 集资、合作建房的销售，实行开工前预售的方式。由集资、合作建房单位按《咸阳市集资建设住房管理暂行办法》的规定，向市经济适用住房行政主管部门申请转售审批。
第三十二条 鼓励房地产开发企业建设用于出租的经济适用住房。开发建设用于出租的经济适用住房，享受经济适用住房的优惠政策，出租给符合购买经济适用住房条件的对象。按购房面积标准，申请市价格行政主管部门会同经济适用住房行政主管部门确定租赁价格，每年公布一次。承租人退租住房后，只要符合购买经济适用住房的条件，仍可申请购买经济适用住房。
第三十三条 个人购买经济适用住房、集资、合作建房在取得房屋所有权证并住满5年后方可上市出售。出售时，应按《咸阳市已购公有住房、经济适用住房上市交易管理办法》的规定执行。
第三十四条 经济适用住房购买人以市场价出售经济适用住房后，不得再购买经济适用住房；如需换购，必须以届时经济适用住房价格出售给已取得经济适用住房资格的住户后，方可再次申请。

第六章 监督管理

第三十五条 市人民政府各有关部门要按照各自的职责，加强对经济适用住房、集资、合作建房的建设、交易中违法、违规、违纪行为的查处：
（一）未经批准擅自改变经济适用住房或集资、合作建房建设用地用途的，由市国土资源行政主管部门依法处罚。
（二）擅自改变经济适用住房和集资、合作建房的规划设计，提高标准，扩大面积或降低标准，偷工减料的，由市经济适用住房行政主管部门依法处罚。
（三）擅自提高经济适用住房或集资、合作建房销售价格，以及不执行市价格行政主管部门制定的经济适用住房租金标准或在价外收费的，由市价格行政主管部门依法处罚。
（四）擅自向未取得资格的家庭出售、出租经济适用住房或组织未取得资格的家庭参加集资、合作建房的，由市经济适用住房行政主管部门责令建设单位限期收回，不能收回的，由建设单位补交同地段经济适用住房或集资、合作建房与商品房价格差，并收回集资、合作建房的批准文件。
第三十六条 市价格行政主管部门要加强对涉及房地产建设项目收费的监督检查，对不按国家及省、市人民政府经济适用住房有关收费规定的，要依法查处。
第三十七条 经济适用住房建设项目在招标、建设和销售的全过程中必须做到公开、公正，社会各界、群众、新闻媒体有权监督，有关行政主管部门应当向社会公开举报电话。
第三十八条 对弄虚作假、隐瞒家庭收入和住房条件、骗购经济适用住房或集资、合作建房的个人，由市经济适用住房行政主管部门追回已购住房或者由购房人按市场价补足购房款，并可责成所在单位对申请人给予行政处分。
第三十九条 市经济适用住房行政主管部门和有关部门在经济适用住房建设管理工作中应当依法行政。行政不作为的，或者滥用职权，徇私舞弊的，由上级行政机关或者监察机关依法、依纪进行严肃处理。

第七章 附 则

第四十条 本规定由市经济适用住房行政主管部门负责解释。
第四十一条 各县（市）人民政府应当根据陕西省实施《经济适用住房管理办法》细则和本规定，结合本地实际就有关需要进一步补充和细化的问题作出具体规定。
第四十二条 本规定自2006年10月9日起施行。

Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.